


## Nationalism, Patriotism, and Support for the European Union

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*Does attachment to a nation enhance or dampen support for the European Union (EU)? Using the 2003 and 2013 ISSP national-identity modules, we isolate and provide multi-item measures of two distinct types of national attachment—nationalism and patriotism. We find that they are positively related yet have divergent effects. We validate the measures showing that nationalism increases, and patriotism decreases, support for nationalistic policies (anti-immigration and protectionism) as expected. We then test the effects of nationalism and patriotism on EU attitudes and find that nationalism increases, and patriotism decreases, opposition to the EU. The presence of a neo-nationalist political party enhanced the effects of nationalism on opposition to the EU, underscoring the importance of political rhetoric in shaping nationalistic EU opposition. In further support of the rhetoric hypothesis, the most-educated nationalists are most likely to oppose the EU in countries with a neo-nationalist political party and vote for such parties when present.*

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Does attachment to a nation enhance or dampen support for the European Union (EU)? The recent emergence and electoral success of European right-wing neo-nationalist political parties such as the Italian Northern League, the French National Rally, and the Austrian Freedom party suggest a negative effect of national attachment on EU support. Leaders of such parties combine an overt love of country with skepticism of supranational forces such as the EU. They promote nationalistic economic and social policies including opposition to the European monetary union, reintroduction of customs borders, opposition to dual citizenship and multiculturalism, and support for border controls inside the Schengen zone. French National Rally leader Marine Le Pen exemplified this nationalistic approach when she promised victory for “patriots” against the threat of “globalists” at the launch of her 2019 EU election campaign. Right-wing nationalist parties have made clear electoral gains in European politics over the last several decades, posing obvious threats to the integrity of the European Union.

Nationalism is only one way, however, in which citizens are psychologically attached to their nation. We argue that undue emphasis on nationalism masks the positive effects of patriotism, a related but distinct form of national attachment, on support for the EU. The past scholarly literature has focused on the effects of national identities and found them to have positive effects on EU support in some studies and negative in others (Carey, 2002; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016; Marks & Hooghe, 2003). But national identities capture both nationalism and patriotism, confusing, and potentially masking, their distinct political effects. In the current article, we document the negative effects of nationalism and the positive effects of patriotism on support for the EU. We thus clarify the role of national attachments in both enhancing and diminishing support for the EU, underscoring the need to better understand the conditions under which one or the other national attachment gains political ascendancy.

Our article unfolds in the following way. We consider the nature of national attachments, underscore the important distinction between nationalism and patriotism, summarize their differing effects on nationalistic policies, and consider what is known about their effects on EU support. We further consider the role of right-wing neo-nationalist parties in enhancing the link between nationalism and EU opposition. We then empirically verify the major distinction between nationalism and patriotism, construct strong measures of each concept, validate these scales by demonstrating their divergent effects on nationalistic policies such as free trade and immigration and superior predictive validity over traditional measures, and show that the divergent effects of nationalism and patriotism extend to support for the EU.

We delve further into the conditions that promote nationalistic opposition to the EU, finding little evidence that nationalism has increased in western Europe following EU enlargement in 2004. Instead, the link between nationalism and opposition to the EU is strongest in countries with a neo-nationalist political party, and even stronger in countries in which such parties gained a sizeable vote share in the most recent national election.<sup>1</sup> The existence of successful neo-nationalist parties also weakens patriotic support for the EU in our data. We attribute the link between a neo-nationalist party and nationalistic EU opposition to the influence of party rhetoric which helps citizens to accurately map their beliefs onto political parties. As further evidence that partisan rhetoric enhances the effects of nationalism on EU opposition, we document the strongest link between nationalism and EU opposition among the best-educated citizens who are most likely to be exposed to and best able to assimilate partisan rhetoric.

### A Primer on National Attachments

Research on national attachments is rife with differing terminology and definitions. Within this conceptual and definitional tangle, there is a clear distinction drawn by many researchers between patriotism and nationalism (Feshbach & Sakano, 1997; Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997). In political psychology, *nationalism* is typically defined as a sense of “national superiority and dominance” consistent with an ethnocentric understanding of the nation that generates hostility towards foreigners. In the current project, we define nationalism as a form of ethno-religious chauvinism that is directed at both foreign nationals and internal ethnic and religious minorities. In contrast, *patriotism* is defined as positive feelings and a sense of pride in one’s country that involves an inclusive sense of national belonging regardless of citizens’ ethnic and religious background (de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003, p. 175).

The distinction between patriotism and nationalism in psychology is grounded in *The Authoritarian Personality*, a seminal work in which the authors differentiated simple love of country, labeled as patriotism, from *pseudopatriotism*, a “blind attachment to certain national cultural values,

<sup>1</sup>Many of the neo-nationalist parties in this research are also considered populist (Inglehart & Norris, 2017). But populism includes anti-elitist stances which we do not examine. We thus use the term “neo-nationalist” to refer to parties which are identified based on their nationalistic stances on key issues.

uncritical conformity with the prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups.” The concept of pseudopatriotism is the intellectual progenitor of nationalism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950, p. 107). Our definitions of patriotism and nationalism are consistent with the distinction drawn by political theorist Maurizio Viroli (1995) between patriots who value the freedoms bestowed by a political republic and feel “a charitable and generous love” for conationals and nationalists who value a nation’s “spiritual and cultural unity” and express “an exclusive attachment” to the nation. To avoid further confusion, we refer very generally to both concepts as specific facets of a broader sense of *national attachment*.

Empirically, nationalism and patriotism have very distinct political effects consistent with our definitions. Nationalism is linked to heightened xenophobia, anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, the derogation of foreigners, classic racism, and a higher social dominance orientation (Ariely, 2012; Blank & Schmidt, 2003; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009; Sidanius et al., 1997; Wagner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, & Schmidt, 2012). In contrast, patriotism fosters adherence to national norms and positive attitudes toward immigration (Huddy & Del Ponte, 2019; Osborne, Satherley, Yogeewaran, Hawi, & Sibley, 2019; Satherley, Yogeewaran, Osborne, & Sibley, 2019). It is commonly defined as “a deeply felt affective attachment to the nation” (Conover, Feldman, & Knight, 1987, p. 1) or the “degree of love for and pride in one’s nation” (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989, p. 271). According to Habermas (1996), patriots are bound together by a liberal political culture, in which citizens “patriotically identify” with civic practices and participatory self-rule. At its essence, patriotism is an ingroup attitude that conveys positive feelings about one’s own nation but does not necessarily lead to outgroup derogation (de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003). Patriotism also heightens adherence to group norms and generates trust in a country’s institutions (Gross, Brewer, & Aday, 2009).

Nationalism has traditionally been measured with questions tapping its chauvinistic side such as agreement with the statement that “other countries should try to make their government as much like ours as possible” (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989, p. 265). Other measures exist, however, that fit our expanded definition of nationalism by assessing support for exclusive ethno-religious national boundaries. An ethnonational conception of the nation is assessed by asking respondents about the desired attitudes and behaviors of “true” or “good” citizens (Bonikowski, 2017). In the United States, ethnonationalism involves the view that a true American is Christian and is born in the United States (Citrin, Reingold, & Green, 1990; Citrin, Wong, & Duff, 2001; Citrin & Wright, 2009). We include similar questions in our scale of nationalism to arrive at a stronger and more theoretically grounded measure that combines national chauvinism and ethno-nationalism. The two concepts are tightly aligned, underscoring the origins of national chauvinism in the perceived superiority of the nation’s ethnic and religious majority. Empirically, ethnonationalism and traditional measures of national chauvinism have very similar effects reinforcing their conceptual overlap (Citrin, Reingold, et al., 1990; Citrin, Wong, et al., 2001; Hochman, Rajimna, & Schmidt, 2016; Lindstam, Matthias, & Harald, 2021; Schildkraut, 2011; Wong, 2010).

### **National Attachments and EU Opposition**

Very little past research on EU support has examined its link to nationalism or patriotism, focusing instead on its association with national identity. Building on these past findings, we expect patriotism to increase support for the EU because a strong national identity (which is linked to patriotism) increases support for European integration. This arises, in part, because national identity is associated with greater trust in national institutions that are, in turn, deeply integrated within the EU (Anderson, 1998; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016; although for contrary findings, see Carey, 2002). On the other hand, nationalism is likely to undercut EU support. Holding an exclusive national identity distinct from Europe diminishes support for the EU and, while this is not a measure of nationalism, the

two have very similar effects (Marks & Hooghe, 2003). Both an exclusive national identity and nationalism increase support for neo-nationalist policies and political parties (Dunn, 2015; Kentmen-Cin & Erisen, 2017; Mayda & Rodrik, 2005; Mudde, 2007).<sup>2</sup>

It is surprising that there has been so little prior research attention devoted to the effects of patriotism and nationalism on EU support. There is some indirect evidence that factors linked to nationalism such as lower levels of educational attainment are associated with EU opposition (Hakhverdian, Van Elsas, Van Der Brug, & Kuhn, 2013; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). Both opposition to the EU and nationalism are also linked to negative attitudes toward minority groups (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005). Domm (2004) is one of the few researchers to directly test these links, showing that nationalism has negative and patriotism positive effects on the belief that one's nation benefits from EU membership. But this research does not examine the link between nationalism, patriotism, and support for the EU. Scotto and colleagues (2018) provide a slightly less direct test, showing greater support for the Leave side in the U.K. Brexit vote among nationalists and greater support for Remain among those classified as globalists.

### *Nationalism and Neo-Nationalist Parties*

How do national attachments become associated with views on European integration and the EU (Lindstam et al., 2021)? Political elites are likely to play an important role in this process, influencing the relative salience of patriotism and nationalism within national discussions concerning the EU (Bonikowski, 2017). In the absence of nationalistic rhetoric, a European nation's existing engagement in the EU and the prior success of the EU project is likely to drive patriotic support. An increase in anti-EU nationalistic rhetoric that pits Europe against the nation will, however, increase the salience of nationalism and heighten its effects on opposition to the EU. As discussed earlier, strong nationalists are inherently suspicious of immigration and foreign influence, but such views will only arouse EU opposition if other Europeans are regarded as foreigners. Nationalistic rhetoric draws a clear boundary between one's own and other nations, generating opposition to supranational entities such as the EU. In this way, nation-first rhetoric arouses opposition to the EU among the highly nationalistic.

We focus centrally on the presence of a neo-nationalist political party within a country to explain why nationalism is more strongly linked to EU opposition in some countries than others. There is indirect evidence that public opposition to the EU increased in tandem with growing Euroskeptical rhetoric in the manifestoes of far-right parties in European member states between 2009 and 2014 (Braun, Popa, & Schmitt, 2019). The presence of a neo-nationalist party may also generate a pro-EU backlash among mainstream political leaders strengthening the link between patriotism and EU support. In an analysis of speeches made by national leaders and EU commissioners between 2007 and 2015, Rauh and colleagues (2020) found a slight decline over time in national leaders' support of the EU combined with growing support from EU commissioners. But interestingly, national leaders who faced strong public Euroskepticism and a strong Euroskeptical party pushed back and spoke in favor of the EU.

### *Elite-Influence Theory*

Elite-influence theory provides the foundation for our prediction that neo-nationalist parties will increase opposition to the EU among the highly nationalistic (Lenz, 2013; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Zaller, 1992). From this perspective, public opinion is a top-down phenomenon driven largely

<sup>2</sup>Schlipphak (2013) and Teney, Laceywell, and De Wilde (2014) find that support for the EU, immigration, and free trade are related and linked to support for supranationalism and international cooperation more generally.

by powerful partisan messages that have their greatest effect on the most politically attentive and knowledgeable (Kalmoe, 2020). Zaller (1992, 2012) posits three factors as necessary for successful elite influence. First, the news media needs to cover an argument or message with some frequency (*supply*); second, a person needs to be exposed to this information (*exposure*); third, a message to which someone is exposed needs to have resonance for them leading to its acceptance or rejection (*acceptance*). If a message conveying nationalistic opposition to the EU is absent from the news, it is unlikely to influence public opinion. On the other hand, if a nationalistic message is ubiquitous within national news media and meets with broad acceptance, it will be persuasive.

### *Supply and Exposure*

The presence of a neo-nationalist political party within a country will increase the salience of nationalistic rhetoric. Moreover, the attention given to a party's message enhances its electoral success. Even at low levels of electoral success, neo-nationalist parties receive considerable media attention (Bischof & Senninger, 2018). Nonetheless, a neo-nationalist party with a larger vote share has typically received greater media attention than one with weaker electoral outcomes (Vliegenthart et al., 2012). Thus, vote share provides an indirect measure of the degree to which a party's nationalistic message has been covered by the news media, enhancing supply of its message. For a nationalistic message to be persuasive a person also needs to have been exposed to it, something that is more common among better than less well-educated citizens who are the most politically attentive independently of supply (Zaller, 1992).

### *Acceptance*

Nationalistic rhetoric conveyed by a neo-nationalist party will not be met with universal agreement because there is variability in the endorsement of nationalism. For those who don't score highly on nationalism, a nationalistic message is unlikely to have resonance or be persuasive. Education will play a role in this process because better educated individuals have a greater ability to understand a message and accept it when it has resonance or reject it when it does not. From that vantage point, well-educated highly nationalistic individuals will be most exposed to and most likely to agree with the message of a neo-nationalist party. As evidence, Kalmoe (2020) demonstrates that partisanship is more tightly connected to core political values, ideology, and policy views among the most politically knowledgeable in ANES data.

The prediction that a nationalistic message will be most persuasive to well-educated nationalists may seem counterintuitive given that support for neo-nationalist parties is more common among the less well-educated (Werts, Scheepers, & Lubbers, 2013). Those high in nationalism tend to have lower levels of educational attainment, helping to explain this finding (Coenders & Scheepers, 2003). Nonetheless, well-educated nationalists exist and will be the most fully exposed to nationalist rhetoric and thus among the first to recognize the link between their own and a party's political stance.

Mainstream political parties attempt to counter nationalistic messages with expressions of patriotic support for the EU (Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2020; Meijers, 2017). According to Zaller, the overall volume and balance of elite messages constitute the "information flow" that reaches the public. If the major political players align behind a single message, then the information flow is "one-sided." If partisan elites are divided, however, sending conflicting messages, then the public has the option of choosing among different sides. When the flow of information is "two-sided," or multisided in the case of multiparty systems, the movement of public opinion is determined by the weight and balance of the respective partisan messages.

We thus focus on the existence and strength of neo-nationalist parties within western European countries as a factor that increases opposition to the EU via news coverage of its nationalistic message. We consider the characteristics of those most likely to receive and accept a nationalistic partisan message that conveys opposition to the EU. Conversely, we examine whether neo-nationalist parties increase support for the EU among strong patriots (Hooghe & Marks, 2004; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016; see also Bischof & Wagner, 2019).

### Research Hypotheses

We develop multi-item measures of nationalism and patriotism and validate their association with nation-first policies such as nativist immigration and protectionist trade. In line with past research, we expect divergent political effects of nationalism and patriotism despite their positive association.

*H1a:* We expect a positive relationship between nationalism and opposition to both expanded immigration and free trade.

In contrast,

*H1b:* We expect a negative relationship between patriotism and opposition to expanded immigration and free trade consistent with prevailing Western European national norms.

*H2:* We expect a positive relationship between EU opposition and nationalism and a negative relationship (stronger EU support) with patriotism.

*H3a:* We expect nationalism to boost opposition to the EU to a greater degree in countries with a neo-nationalist party.

*H3b:* We expect nationalism to have a stronger effect on EU opposition proportional to a party's vote share in national elections, reflecting variation in the degree to which citizens are exposed to the nationalistic rhetoric of a neo-nationalist party.

*H4:* We expect the positive link between nationalism and anti-EU sentiment and the positive effect of patriotism on pro-EU sentiment in countries with a neo-nationalist party to be strongest among the best educated nationalists and patriots.

Following Zaller (1992), we assume that better educated citizens are most exposed to political party rhetoric and better able to recognize and accept arguments made by a party whose position is consistent with their political beliefs.

*H5a:* We test whether nationalists are more likely and patriots less likely to vote for a neo-nationalist party.

*H5b:* We test whether these patterns are stronger for better than less well-educated individuals.

### *Cross-National Variation*

We control for country in all analyses to account for meaningful national variation in EU support based on a country's distinct geography, history, and economics. There is evidence, for example, that left-leaning residents of social welfare states may be more opposed to the EU than others because they wish to preserve their generous welfare state. In contrast residents of more liberal economies,

**Table 1.** Western European Countries in ISSP National Identity Modules

Country	2003		Neo-Nationalist Party	2013		
	<i>N</i>	Vote Share		<i>N</i>	Vote Share	Neo-Nationalist Party
Austria	1006	10.0%	Freedom Party of Austria	0		
Belgium	0			2202		
Denmark	1322	12.4%	Danish People's Party	1325	12.2%	Danish People's Party
Finland	1379	1.0%	True Finns	1243	19.1%	True Finns
France	1669	11.1%	National Front	2017	13.6%	National Front, National Rally
Germany	1287			1717	4.7%	Alternative for Germany
Ireland	1065			1215		
Netherlands	1823	17.0%	List Pym Fortuyn	0		
Portugal	1602			1001		
Spain	1212			1225		
Sweden	1186			1090	12.9%	Sweden Democrats
United Kingdom	873	31.7%	Conservatives, UKIP	904	36.1%	Conservatives, UKIP
<i>Total with Nat. Party</i>	4357			6234		
<i>Total by Year</i>	<b>14,424</b>			<b>13,939</b>		

*Note:* The ISSP national-identity modules excluded Belgium in 2003 and Austria and the Netherlands in 2013.

especially those on the left, are more favorable to the EU because it can lead to greater income equality (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016; Garry & Tilley, 2009, 2015).

## Data and Methods

### *Sample*

The ISSP national-identity modules provide an excellent opportunity to examine the effects of national attachments on EU support. We focus on national attachments in 12 EU member states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) that were EU members in 2003 and included in the 2003 or 2013 ISSP National Identity Modules. We focus on Western European countries because of their long-standing EU membership, which has fostered over time the development of pro-EU national norms. Such associations formed during a period of peace and prosperity, providing clear evidence in the 1980s and 1990s that EU citizens were doing better together than apart. Table 1 provides a list of included countries, their respective sample sizes in each ISSP module, and the presence and name of neo-nationalist parties at each time point. Several countries appear in the data in only one of the two modules (Austria is only included in 2003; Belgium and the Netherlands only in 2013).

The total number of respondents in all waves and countries is 28,363. Data are weighted within country in all analyses using poststratification weights included in the ISSP data<sup>3</sup> and analyzed in two ways: with all countries combined to simplify analyses and then separately within each country (except for analyses that interact national attachments with the country-wide variable for

<sup>3</sup>See <http://www.gesis.org/issp/modules/issp-modules-by-topic/national-identity>

neo-nationalist party). We note instances in which findings in individual countries diverge from the overall pattern.

### *Survey Measures*

#### *Nationalism and Patriotism Measurement Model*

We included all nationalism and patriotism items in the ISSP national-identity modules in a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).<sup>4</sup> As noted earlier, we define nationalism as ethno-religious chauvinism and expect standard nationalism scale items to load with measures of ethnonational conception on a single nationalism factor. Patriotism and civic national-conception items were also expected to cohere into a single factor, capturing an inclusive definition of, and positive attachment to, the nation. These expectations met with empirical support. The best fit was a two-factor (nationalism and patriotism) solution with the following fit statistics: CFI = .951; TLI = .923; RMSEA = .042; SRMR = .039 (see Table S1 in the online supporting information for details). The model included a method factor for items that were asked in agree-disagree format (V17-V22). It also included correlated errors between items assessed on the same response scale (e.g., proud, important). Table 1 includes the wording of all items, the unstandardized factor loadings, and standardized estimates in parentheses.

Nationalism is strongly defined by items in the ethnonational conception battery (e.g., the importance of having been born in the country) and traditional nationalism scale items that capture national chauvinism. This single factor confirms that in these data nationalism reflects a form of ethno-religious chauvinism. Patriotism is defined by feelings of pride in various aspects of national life and an inclusive sense of national identity that involves feeling like a national and respecting the nation's institutions. Nationalism and patriotism are highly correlated in the measurement model (.80).

The 11 nationalism items were weighted by their standardized factor loading in Table 2 and combined to form a reliable scale ( $\alpha = .81$ ) that was rescaled to vary from 0 to 1 (alphas ranged from .79 in Belgium and Germany to .85 in Spain; see Table S2 in the online supporting information for scale reliability by country). The 14 patriotism items were weighted by their standardized factor loading in Table 2 and combined to form a reliable patriotism scale ( $\alpha = .78$ ) that was rescaled from 0 to 1 (alphas ranged from .75 in France and Sweden to .85 in Spain; Table S2). The two additive weighted scales are correlated at .46 (lower than in the CFA which accounts for measurement error). Nationalism and patriotism are thus positively linked and more strongly so once scales are corrected for measurement error. There is also evidence that nationalism was slightly higher in 2013 than in 2003, whereas patriotism remained stable over time (see Table S3; Table S4 in the online supporting information contains descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analyses).<sup>5</sup>

We created several scales to tap support for nationalistic policies and opposition to the EU which are used to validate the nationalism and patriotism scales.

<sup>4</sup>We began with 27 items but dropped two reverse-worded items: V23 (I am less proud of [COUNTRY] than I would like to be) and V24 (The world would be a better place if [NATIONALS] acknowledged [COUNTRY'S] shortcomings). The items had null or negative factor loadings despite the inclusion of an agreement response-set factor.

<sup>5</sup>In addition, Table S3 in the online supporting information reveals other differences in the determinants of nationalism and patriotism (controlling for the other factor). Education was negatively linked to nationalism and positively to patriotism; women were less nationalistic but more patriotic than men. Countries also showed differing trends in nationalism and patriotism: When compared to the United Kingdom (control), nationalism was higher in Austria and Denmark but patriotism was lower. Those who attend religious services regularly and with native parents were consistently higher in nationalism and patriotism. Tables A5 and A6 list the determinants of nationalism and patriotism by country.



*Anti-Immigration*

Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the following four statements: “Immigrants increase crime rates”; “Immigrants are generally good for [COUNTRY’s] economy”; “Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [COUNTRY]”; “Immigrants improve [COUNTRY’s] society by bringing new ideas and culture.” All items were combined to form a reliable scale ( $\alpha = .80$ ) and rescaled to range from 0 to 1 (alphas ranged from .77 in Denmark and Spain to .86 in France).

*Cultural and Economic Protectionism*

Respondents were asked to agree or disagree on a 5-point scale with the following five items: “[COUNTRY] should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy”; “[COUNTRY] should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations”; “Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in [COUNTRY]”; “[COUNTRY’s] television should give preference to [COUNTRY’s] films and programs”; “Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local business in [COUNTRY].” All items were combined to form a scale and rescaled to range from 0 to 1. The items formed a reliable scale ( $\alpha = .69$ ) with alphas ranging from .57 in Portugal to .73 in Germany and the United Kingdom.

*Anti-European Union*

Three questions tapped support for the EU. First, respondents were asked “Generally speaking, would you say that [COUNTRY] benefits or does not benefit from being a member of the European Union?” (see also Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). Second, respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the following statement: “[COUNTRY] should follow European Union decisions, even if it does not agree with them.” Third, respondents were asked, “Generally, do you think that the European Union should have much more, more, as much, less, or much less power than the national government of its member states.” All three items were combined to form a reliable scale ( $\alpha = .68$ ) and rescaled to range from 0 to 1 (alphas ranged from .58 in Austria to .78 in Denmark).<sup>6</sup>

*Demographics*

Analyses include several demographic controls. Age is measured in years. Dummy variables were created for five 15-year birth cohorts to capture generational differences in national attachments and EU support: 1900–39, 1940–54, 1955–69, 1970–84, and 1985–99 (see also Down & Wilson, 2013). We expected greater support for the EU, for example, among more recent birth cohorts. Education is created from attained degree or years of schooling when information about degree is absent and divided into six levels: no formal education, some primary, completed primary, some secondary, completed secondary, at least some tertiary. Religious attendance was assessed on a 6-point scale that ranged from never to several times or more a week. Immigrant background was assessed by a single question on whether one of the respondent’s parents was not a citizen.

<sup>6</sup>These questions were not asked in Germany in either year, or in Ireland or the United Kingdom in 2003, reducing the  $N$  in analyses of EU opposition.

**Table 2.** Nationalism and Patriotism Measurement Model (ISSP 2003 and 2013)

		Nationalism		Patriotism	
V9	How important is it to have been born in [COUNTRY]?	1.00	(.53)		
V10	How important is it to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizenship?	.77	(.50)		
V11	How important is it to have lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one's life?	.77	(.46)		
V12	How important is it to speak [COUNTRY LANGUAGE]?	.31	(.21)		
V13	How important is it to be a [religion]?	.96	(.48)		
V14	How important is it to respect [COUNTRY]'s political institutions?			1.00	(.23)
V15	How important is it to feel [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]?			2.16	(.45)
V16	How important is it to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestry?	1.12	(.56)		
V17	I would rather be a citizen of [COUNTRY] than of any other country in the world	.99	(.66)		
V18_01 <sup>a</sup>	There are some things about [COUNTRY] that make me feel ashamed of [COUNTRY] <sup>a</sup>	.28	(.17)		
V19	The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [COUNTRY]	.77	(.51)		
V20	Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is a better country than most other countries	.70	(.47)		
V21	People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong	.88	(.53)		
V22	When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]			2.64	(.58)
V25	How proud are you of [COUNTRY] in the way democracy works?			1.18	(.25)
V26	How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s political influence in the world?			1.50	(.34)
V27	How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s economic achievements?			1.28	(.26)
V28	How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s social security system?			.80	(.16)
V29	How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s scientific and technological achievements?			.97	(.24)
V30	How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s achievements in sports?			1.98	(.43)
V31	How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s achievements in the arts and literature?			.90	(.21)
V32	How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s armed forces?			2.79	(.51)
V33	How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s history?			2.57	(.53)
V34	How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s fair and equal treatment of all groups in society?			1.52	(.31)
V58	How proud are you of being [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]?			3.39	(.77)
<b>Correlation between factors</b>		<b>.80</b>			

*Note.*  $N = 28,363$ . One item loading for each factor is constrained to 1.00 for identification. Cells contain unstandardized factor loadings with standardized estimates in parentheses and standardized factor correlations. All factor loadings and correlations are significant (1% level).

<sup>a</sup> Reversed item.

Fit Statistics: CFI = .951; TLI = .923; RMSEA = .042; SRMR = .0439. V23 and V24 were excluded because their loading was 0 or negative.

*Neo-Nationalist Political Party Classification*

Data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) were used to identify countries that contained a neo-nationalist party in 2003 and 2013 (Bakker et al., 2015). More specifically, we based judgments about the presence of a neo-nationalist party in 2003 on data in the 2002 CHES survey and in 2013 on data in the 2014 CHES survey. In 2002, 250 experts evaluated 171 parties in the EU-14 countries plus 10 prospective EU members. In the 2014 survey, 337 experts evaluated 268 parties in all EU countries. Experts coded parties on numerous criteria. We focused on several indicators that identified a party as neo-nationalist: opposition to EU integration, the salience of EU opposition, opposition to immigration, and opposition to multiculturalism. Unfortunately, information on immigration and multiculturalism was not collected in the CHES survey until 2006, and we include that information to make judgments on the existence of a neo-nationalist party in 2003.

We identified a neo-nationalist party as a party that scored above .6 in EU opposition (roughly 20% of all parties), above .5 in the salience of their stance in opposition to the EU to ensure their position was visible, and above .8 in their opposition to immigration or multiculturalism (between 10% and 15% of parties).<sup>7</sup> Ratings of all parties are included in Table S5 in the online supporting information and the designation of neo-nationalist parties is listed in Table 2. Our scheme identifies parties widely identified as neo-nationalist. As seen in Table 2, Austria (Freedom Party, FPO), Denmark (Danish People's Party, DF), Finland (True Finns, PS), France (National Front/National Rally, FN), Germany (Alternative for Germany, AfD), Netherlands (List Pym Fortuyn, LPF), Sweden (Swedish Democrats, SD), and the United Kingdom (Conservatives, CONS, and UKIP) had a neo-nationalist party in one or both years of the ISSP survey. Belgium did not have a neo-nationalist party in 2013, the only year in which it was included. Ireland, Portugal, and Spain lacked a neo-nationalist party at either time point.

**Results***Protectionism, Anti-Immigration, and the EU*

We turn first to examine the differing political effects of nationalism and patriotism. Anti-immigration attitudes and support for protectionism were regressed onto national attachments and a set of demographic controls. In support of Hypothesis 1a, nationalism boosts support for both anti-immigration and protectionist policies whereas the effects of patriotism are significant in the opposite direction, driving support for immigration and opposition to protectionism consistent with Hypothesis 1b (Table 3, Models 1 and 2). Our findings corroborate past evidence on the divergent political consequences of nationalism and patriotism, confirming the predictive validity of both scales. The contrasting political effects of nationalism and patriotism are especially striking given their positive bivariate relationship.

We turn, next, to the differing effects of nationalism and patriotism on opposition to the EU, our central focus, by regressing EU opposition onto national attachments and the same set of controls. Nationalism was associated with greater opposition and patriotism with greater support for the EU, consistent with hypothesis Hypothesis 2 (Model 3 in Table 3). The negative coefficient for patriotism is somewhat larger than the positive coefficient for nationalism, suggesting that pro-EU national norms continued to shape support for the EU during this time period,

<sup>7</sup>Seventeen percent of all parties in 2002 and 26% of parties in 2014 were rated as or above .6 on the anti-EU scale. The Vlaams Belang (VB) party in Belgium qualified in all respects except the salience of its EU opposition fell just below the cut off (.46). We reran major analyses with VB included as a neo-nationalist party and major results remained unchanged. Analyses available on request.

**Table 3.** Nationalism, Patriotism, Support for Nationalistic Policies, and Opposition to the EU

	Anti-Immigration		Protectionism		Anti-European Union			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
Neo-Nat Party							-.04	(.01)**
Nationalism	.77	(.01)***	.65	(.01)***	.20	(.01)***	.05	(.02)*
× Neo-Nat Party							.22	(.03)***
Patriotism	-.37	(.02)***	-.07	(.01)***	-.35	(.02)***	-.31	(.03)***
× Neo-Nat Party							.05	(.04)
Year: 2013	.02	(.00)***	.01	(.00)*	.02	(.00)***	-.02	(.00)***
Education	-.16	(.00)***	-.12	(.00)***	-.12	(.01)***	-.12	(.01)***
Female	-.01	(.00)***	.01	(.00)***	.03	(.00)***	.03	(.00)***
Age	-.00	(.00)	.00	(.00)**	.00	(.00)	.00	(.00)
<i>Cohort</i>								
1940–54	.01	(.01)	-.01	(.00)	.02	(.01)**	.02	(.01)**
1955–69	.01	(.01)	-.00	(.01)	.03	(.01)**	.03	(.01)**
1970–84	.01	(.01)	-.00	(.01)	.03	(.01)*	.03	(.01)*
1985–99	.02	(.01)	-.01	(.01)	.02	(.02)	.02	(.02)
Parents Citizens	.10	(.00)***	.03	(.00)***	.05	(.00)***	.05	(.00)***
Constant	.39	(.02)***	.32	(.02)***	.65	(.02)***	.66	(.03)***
Country Fixed Effects		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
<i>N</i>	27,385		27,293		21,722		21,722	
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.30		.34		.11		.12	

Note. OLS regression coefficients with standard error in parentheses.

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

although there was also slightly greater opposition to the EU in 2013 than in 2003.<sup>8</sup> When data are analyzed separately by country, nationalism has a significant positive effect on anti-immigration, protectionism, and EU opposition in each country. Patriotism consistently reduces opposition to immigration and the EU in all countries, but its effects are less consistent across countries for protectionism (and do not reach significance in eight of the 12 countries; analyses available upon request).

There are several other consistent trends seen in Table 3. Less well-educated respondents and those with parents who are citizens are more supportive of anti-immigration and protectionist policies and more opposed to the EU.<sup>9</sup> Women are less opposed to immigration and more supportive of the EU but also more supportive than men of protectionism. Older respondents are more supportive than the young of protectionism; baby boomers and those born during and right after World War II are more opposed to the EU than the prewar (baseline) and recent cohorts (see also Down & Wilson, 2013). In addition, better educated respondents and the children of immigrants were less likely to oppose immigration or multiculturalism, and there was more opposition to both policies in 2013 than in 2003.

<sup>8</sup>The effects of nationalism and patriotism are also robust to the inclusion of shorter scales that omit measures of national conceptions (Table S6 in the online supporting information). Once again, nationalism increased and patriotism decreased opposition to immigration, support for protectionism, and opposition to the EU.

<sup>9</sup>The divergent political effects of nationalism and patriotism shown in Table 3 replicate when a continuous education measure is replaced by dummy variables for each educational category, indicating growing support for the EU at higher levels of education (Table S7 in the online supporting information).

*Neo-Nationalist Parties and the Political Effects of Nationalism*


The coefficient for nationalism is stronger in analyses predicting the two nationalistic policies than EU opposition (Table 3). This raises a question about factors that heighten the link between nationalism and EU opposition. Our third hypothesis (*H3*) is that the nationalistic rhetoric of neo-nationalist political parties strengthens this connection. In support of this hypothesis, there is a significant interaction between nationalism and the presence of a neo-nationalist party in the analysis examining opposition to the EU (Table 3, Model 4). Thus, the link between nationalism and opposition to the EU is consistently greater in a country with a neo-nationalist political party at a given point in time. In the absence of a neo-nationalist party, however, nationalism has a much weaker effect on opposition to the EU. This finding underscores the importance of a neo-nationalist political party to the emergence of nationalistic opposition to the EU.

The effects of nationalism and patriotism on opposition to the EU are depicted in Figure 1 separately for country/time period in which a neo-nationalist party is present (dotted line) and absent (continuous line). In a country/time period with a neo-nationalist party, nationalism has a much larger effect on EU opposition than in country/time periods that lack a neo-nationalist party. In contrast, patriotism diminishes EU opposition to approximately the same degree regardless of the presence of a neo-nationalist party. In sum, the analyses shown in Table 3 and depicted in Figure 1 illustrate that nationalism is more likely to generate opposition to the EU in the presence than in the absence of a neo-nationalist political party.


These results raise questions about the direction of causality, however. Perhaps neo-nationalist parties are more likely to emerge in strongly nationalistic countries. This is a reasonable supposition but one that does not meet with empirical support. We compared levels of nationalism and patriotism in countries and time periods in which a neo-nationalist party existed to those in which it did not. Mean scores on the nationalism and patriotism scales in countries/time periods with and without a neo-nationalist party are shown in Figure 2. In countries with a neo-nationalist party, nationalism is actually slightly *lower* and patriotism slightly *higher* than in countries that lack such a party [ $t(28,102) = 9.39, p < .001$  and  $t(28,218) = 8.42, p < .001$ , respectively]. There are only modest differences in levels of nationalism across countries, and levels of nationalism do not map in any obvious way onto countries that do and do not have a neo-nationalist party (for example, Denmark has one of the lowest levels of nationalism yet has a neo-nationalist party; Ireland has one of the highest levels and does not; Table S3 in the online supporting information). Moreover, as we noted earlier, nationalism has increased only slightly between 2003 and 2013 despite the growing prominence of neo-nationalist parties (Table S3). These observations dispel the common intuition that neo-nationalist parties thrive in nationalistic countries. Rather, neo-nationalist parties make political gains by capitalizing on existing and stable levels of nationalistic sentiment within and among countries.

Drawing on elite-influence theory, we predicted that the influence of nationalism on EU opposition within a country depends on the supply of nationalistic rhetoric. The simple existence of a neo-nationalist party is a crude indicator of the amount of nationalistic rhetoric to which citizens are exposed. To examine the supply/exposure hypothesis more fully, we replace the existence of a neo-nationalist party in analyses with its vote share in the prior national election. Vote share is squared to correct for the highly skewed data. In most countries, neo-nationalist parties received somewhere between 1% and 20% of the vote. The exception is the United Kingdom, where the neo-nationalist Conservative Party exceeded 30% of vote share at both time points (Table 1); squaring vote share helps to normalize the data.

The marginal effect of nationalism on EU opposition across the squared value of vote share is depicted in Figure 3 with squared values on the x-axis indicated by the percentile of vote share (based on analyses in Table S8 in the online supporting information). As a neo-nationalistic party's vote share increases, the marginal effect of nationalism on EU opposition increases sharply (Figure 3,



**Figure 1.** Effect of nationalism and patriotism on anti-immigration attitudes and EU opposition by presence (dotted line) and absence (continuous line) of a neo-nationalist party. The graphs are based on Model 4 in Table 3 and display the predicted strength of opposition to the EU.




**Figure 2.** Nationalism and patriotism by presence of a neo-nationalist party. Nationalism is higher and patriotism is lower in country-years without a neo-nationalist party. \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

left panel). In contrast, the marginal effect of patriotism on opposition to the EU is negative (driving support) and constant (Figure 3, right panel). Together, these findings suggest that neo-nationalist parties capitalize on a specific type of national attachment—nationalism—to undermine support for the EU. There is no evidence, however, that the presence of a neo-nationalist political party elicits a patriotic backlash by further enhancing EU support.

*Neo-Nationalist Party and Education: Exposure and Acceptance*

In the elite-influence model, the best educated citizens are most likely to be exposed to a party’s rhetoric and have the political resources to understand the message and accept or reject it as consistent or inconsistent with their existing predispositions. We therefore expected nationalism to have its strongest effect on well-educated respondents in countries with a successful neo-nationalist political party (H4). We ran additional analyses, examining the interaction between nationalism, presence of



**Figure 3.** Marginal effect of nationalism and patriotism on EU opposition across the range of vote share. The graphs are based on Model 1 in Table S8 in the online supporting information. Plotted lines represent the marginal effect of nationalism/patriotism on EU opposition ranging from the lowest to highest percentile of vote-share scores (roughly 40% of respondents are scored at 0 because they lacked a neo-nationalist party). Dark error bands represent 95% confidence intervals.


a neo-nationalist party, and education to test this prediction. The hypothesis is confirmed as seen in Figure 4 (based on analyses in Table S9 in the online supporting information).<sup>10</sup> In the absence of a neo-nationalist party, EU opposition increases across the range of nationalism at all levels of education, and those with the lowest level of educational attainment are consistently most opposed to the EU. In the presence of a neo-nationalist party, however, nationalism has its greatest effect on EU opposition among the best educated. This effect is powerful, eliminating any difference in EU opposition by level of educational attainment at the highest levels of nationalism. In contrast, patriotism has a uniformly negative effect on EU opposition regardless of education (see Figure S1 in the online supporting information).

We repeated these analyses replacing the presence of a neo-nationalist party with its vote share in the most recent election, and while we observe similar trends, as seen in Figure 5, the three-way interaction is not significant (based on the analysis in Table S8 in the online supporting information). This figure plots the marginal effect of nationalism on EU opposition at three levels of education (primary school, upper secondary, and some tertiary). In countries with a neo-nationalist party, EU opposition increases more steeply among the best than the least educated across the range of nationalism but not significantly so. These findings are complicated by large standard errors and make it difficult to conclude that better educated respondents react to higher levels of exposure to a neo-nationalist party to translate nationalism into party support. We can say with greater certainty that those with a tertiary education translate nationalism into EU opposition more fully than those with a primary school education (as seen in Figure 4).<sup>11</sup>

In sum, neo-nationalist parties succeed in driving opposition to the EU in part by weakening support for the EU among well-educated highly nationalistic supporters. We believe this happens

<sup>10</sup>We find similar results if we use short nationalism and patriotism scales without national-conception measures (Table S10; Figure S2 in the online supporting information).

<sup>11</sup>A robustness check based on a short version of the nationalism scale is included in Table S11 in the online supporting information.



**Figure 4.** Effect of nationalism on EU opposition by presence of a neo-nationalist party and level of education. Graphs display the predicted value of EU opposition. Both graphs are based on analyses in Table S9 in the online supporting information. Dark error bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

because well-educated nationalists are more fully exposed to and better understand the nationalistic appeals of neo-nationalist parties. Figures 4 and 5 make clear that nationalism is linked to EU opposition even in the absence of a neo-nationalist party, and in that setting, EU opposition is strongest among those with lower levels of educational attainment. The relationship between nationalism and EU opposition is intensified in the presence of a neo-nationalist party among the well-educated. We have suggestive evidence that a visible neo-nationalist party may further help well-educated nationalistic individuals to translate their nationalism into EU opposition, but as noted these trends are not significant. In contrast, patriotism decreases opposition to the EU for all education levels regardless of the presence of a neo-nationalist party (Figure S1 in the online supporting information).


#### *Voting for a Neo-Nationalist Party*

Neo-nationalist parties increase opposition to the EU, in part, by arousing opposition among strong, well-educated nationalists. We now take one step back to examine whether nationalism boosts and patriotism reduces electoral support for neo-nationalist political parties. We combined two slightly different questions in the ISSP data to test these assumptions. In 2013, ISSP respondents were asked if they had voted and which party they had voted for in the most recent national election. In 2003, respondents were asked if they had voted and their primary party affiliation. We exclude individuals who did not vote in a previous election and created a variable for neo-nationalist party support in countries and years that had such a party. In 2003, individuals who identified with a neo-nationalist party and had voted in the recent election were scored 1. In 2013, individuals who said they had voted for a neo-nationalist party were scored 1.

Strong nationalists were more likely and patriots less likely to vote for or identify with a neo-nationalist party, in support of Hypothesis 5a (Table 4).<sup>12</sup> These effects are largely consistent within each country with some minor exceptions as seen in Figure 6. Nationalism significantly boosts support for a neo-nationalist party in all countries except Austria. In additional analyses not shown here,

<sup>12</sup>Results hold if we use short nationalism and patriotism scales (Table S12 in the online supporting information) that omit national-conception measures.





**Figure 5.** Marginal effect of nationalism on EU opposition by vote share of neo-nationalist parties and education level. Graph based on Model 2 in Table S8 in the online supporting information. Plotted lines represent the marginal effect of nationalism on EU opposition ranging from the lowest to highest percentile of vote-share scores (roughly 40% of respondents are scored at 0 because they lacked a neo-nationalist party). Dark error bands represent 95% confidence intervals.


**Table 4.** Nationalism, Education, and Vote for Neo-Nationalist Parties: Voters Only

	(1)		(2)	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
Nationalism	4.85	(.37)***	1.49	(.76)*
× Education			5.69	(1.12)***
Patriotism	-2.75	(.54)***	-3.29	(1.25)**
× Education			.93	(1.99)
Year: 2013	.88	(.11)***	.84	(.11)***
Education	-.69	(.15)***	-3.52	(.59)***
Female	-.41	(.07)***	-.40	(.07)***
Age	-.01	(.01)	-.01	(.01)
<i>Cohort</i>				
1940–54	.15	(.16)	.11	(.16)
1955–69	.16	(.25)	.14	(.25)
1970–84	.08	(.36)	.08	(.36)
1985–99	.24	(.48)	.27	(.47)
Parents citizens	.26	(.17)	.28	(.17)
Constant	-1.40	(.62)	.29	(.70)
Country fixed effects	Yes		Yes	
N	12,947		12,947	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.15		.16	

Note. Logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

patriotism dampens the vote for a neo-nationalist party in all countries except Germany and the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, the inability of patriotism to weaken support for a neo-nationalist party (i.e., the Conservative Party) is especially intriguing and may arise because it is a



**Figure 6.** Nationalism and vote for neo-nationalist party by country. Graphs are based on Model 1 in Table 4 and display the predicted probabilities of voting for a neo-nationalist party. Dark error bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

mainstream party that takes a stand on a broad array of issues, not just the EU. We also note that voting for neo-nationalist parties was more common in 2013 than in 2003. Better educated individuals and women were also less likely to vote for or support a neo-nationalist party.

Finally, we examined whether nationalism had stronger effects on support for a neo-nationalist party among the better educated and found that it did, consistent with effects observed earlier for opposition to the EU. As seen in Model 2 (Table 4), there is a large positive coefficient for the interaction between nationalism and education. For strong nationalists, education critically determines the probability of voting for a neo-nationalist party: Highly educated nationalists are almost twice as likely than those with a moderate amount of education to vote for a neo-nationalist party and almost four times as likely as the poorly educated, providing support for Hypothesis 5b (see also Figure S3 in the online supporting information). This is a striking finding and underscores the importance of exposure to political rhetoric in order to link nationalism to vote choice. The interaction between nationalism and education is significant in all countries except Finland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The interaction between patriotism and education does not reach statistical significance.

## Conclusion

Our findings underscore the complex relationship between attachment to the nation and support for the EU. Despite their positive association, nationalism and patriotism have opposing political effects on nationalistic policies. Nationalism promotes whereas patriotism dampens opposition to immigration, support for protectionism, opposition to the EU, and support for neo-nationalist political parties.

This clear dichotomy between the effects of nationalism and patriotism underlies the distinct measurement properties of the two scales. We conceptualized nationalism as a form of ethno-religious chauvinism and measured it with a combination of items used traditionally to measure national chauvinism and items typically used to tap ethnonationalism. Empirically, we find that they measure the same concept. We conceived patriotism as a mixture of love of country and civic conceptions of what defines the nation. Accordingly, we measured patriotism using questions tapping national pride and civic national conceptions. They too cohere empirically into a single scale.

Critics might question why traditional political psychology measures of nationalism and patriotism were inadequate to test our hypotheses. As noted earlier, analyses with the traditional items obtained similar albeit somewhat weaker results. From a psychometric perspective, scales made up of multiple related items are always better indicators of a concept because they capture variance common to all items, enhance scale variance to provide a more accurate assessment of relationships with other variables, and reduce noise caused by measurement error. In addition, our expanded definition of nationalism captures well the range of policies pursued by neo-nationalist parties which include internal repression of religious and ethnic minority groups, external exclusion of foreigners, and a rejection of foreign influence. We hope this effort to provide expanded measures of nationalism and patriotism will help to unify research on the political effects of national attachments which is rife with different and sometimes conflicting definitions, measures, and results.

One of the main theoretical contributions of this study is to meld an elite-influence model with the study of national attachments to underscore the important role of political rhetoric in the politicization of nationalism. We find that neo-nationalist parties enhance the link between nationalism and opposition to the EU. Moreover, party influence increases with national media exposure which is measured indirectly in this study as the party's vote share in recent national elections (Berning, Lubbers, & Schlueter, 2019). In contrast, the presence of neo-nationalist parties does not weaken the positive effects of patriotism on EU support, demonstrating the importance of empirically distinguishing the two types of national attachments. The findings are consistent with research showing that political rhetoric is needed to translate societal trends, such as an increase in the immigrant population, into policy attitudes (Bruter, 2003; Hopkins, 2010).

The effect of neo-nationalist parties on opposition to the EU is strongest among the best educated nationalists. This finding reinforces evidence that the best educated citizens are the staunchest partisans, in line with the predictions of elite-influence theory (Kalmoe, 2020; Zaller, 2012). It is also consistent with a large literature in political psychology demonstrating the susceptibility of sophisticated voters to elite messaging and political rhetoric (Lodge & Taber, 2013; Miller, 2011; Zaller, 1992). This finding does not annul evidence that neo-nationalist parties receive stronger support from less well-educated citizens (Arzheimer, 2009; Bovens & Wille, 2010; Hakhverdian et al., 2013; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002). In the absence of a neo-nationalist party, those with lower levels of educational attainment are more opposed than the better educated to the EU at all levels of nationalism. But in the presence of a neo-nationalist party, the effects of nationalism are enhanced among the best educated, boosting opposition to the EU and increasing electoral party support among well-educated nationalists. The presence of a neo-nationalist party is thus highly consequential for the best educated nationalists, increasing their opposition to the EU.

Importantly, the presence of a neo-nationalist party in a country is not associated with greater nationalism. We find the opposite: Aggregate levels of nationalism and patriotism are similar across countries with and without such parties. Contrary to intuition and the claim that neo-nationalist parties increase nationalism, nationalism is slightly higher and patriotism slightly lower in countries *without* a neo-nationalist party.

We have focused largely on nationalism as a source of opposition to the EU. However, it is important to note that patriotism plays an even more powerful role in maintaining EU support. Patriotism sharply reduces opposition to the EU and its effects are larger than the opposing effects of

nationalism. The key question is whether patriotism will continue to drive EU support across Western Europe especially with the emergence of nationalist, Euroskeptical political parties. This is a question that deserves deeper investigation. Ultimately, the important question is whether nationalistic anti-EU appeals can overcome patriotic EU support.

In the first two decades of the 21st century, patriotic support for the EU has remained somewhat stronger than nationalistic opposition even in countries with a neo-nationalist party. In all 12 Western European countries included in the ISSP data, mainstream political parties continue to support the EU (except for the UK Conservatives). Public support for remaining within the EU also remains strong (except for the United Kingdom and Greece; Pew 2019). This balance could shift, however, if mainstream parties alter their political rhetoric to accommodate neo-nationalist parties. There is evidence that a neo-nationalist party can lead mainstream political parties to weaken their support for immigration (Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2020). Perhaps neo-nationalist parties could also provoke mainstream parties to weaken their support of the EU, eroding support for the supranational entity among strong patriots. In the end, the future of Europe may depend on the interaction between neo-nationalist and mainstream political parties: Any erosion of pro-EU norms or accommodation of nationalistic policies could tilt the scales in nationalism's favor.

### ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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### Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web site:

**Table S1.** Factor Analysis: Model Comparison by Fit Statistics

**Table S2.** Scale Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) by Country

**Table S3.** Determinants of Nationalism and Patriotism

**Table S4.** Descriptive Statistics

**Table S5.** Party Ratings Based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES)

**Table S6.** Nationalism, Patriotism, Support for Nationalistic Policies, and Opposition to the EU (with Short National Attachment Scales).

**Table S7.** Nationalism, Patriotism, Support for Nationalistic Policies, and Opposition to the EU (with Dummy Variables for Education)

**Table S8.** Neo-Nationalist Party Vote Share, Education, and EU Opposition

**Table S9.** Presence of a Neo-Nationalist Party, Education, and EU Opposition

**Table S10.** Presence of a Neo-Nationalist Party, Education, and EU Opposition (with Short National Attachment Scales)

**Table S11.** Opposition to the EU and Neo-Nationalist Party Vote Share (with Short National Attachment Scales)

**Table S12.** Nationalism, Patriotism, Education, and Voting for a Neo-Nationalist Party (with Short National Attachment Scales)

**Figure S1.** Effect of patriotism on EU opposition by education and presence of a neo-nationalist party.

**Figure S2.** Effect of nationalism and pride on EU opposition across the range of neo-nationalist party vote share squared (with short national attachment scales).

**Figure S3.** Effect of nationalism and patriotism on the probability of voting for a neo-nationalist party (by education levels).